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ABSTRAKSI 
Bagaikan buah simalakama, stratejik aliansi sesama industri (aliansi horizontal) 
selalu mengalami dilema antara bekerja sama dan berkompetensi. Di samping itu, mereka 
menghadapi risiko bahwa core competence mereka nantinya dapat terserap oleh partner 
aliansi yang notabene kompetitor mereka juga. Untuk itu perusahaan perlu melakukan 
“black box protection”. Dengan melakukan kualitatif studi antara perusahaan Belanda 
dan Amerika, paper ini mengetengahkan sebuah framework yang akan sangat membantu 
para manajer aliansi dalam mengelola “black box protection” mereka. Penelitian ini 
menemukan bahwa ada tiga variabel penentu yang bisa dijadikan tolok ukur kapan kita 
harus membagi dan melindungi core competence kita: tipe pengetahuan; hubungan 
dengan kompetitor; dan kecepatan perubahan teknologi. 
Kata kunci:  spillover of control, Trojan Horse, black box protection, control, core 
competence 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A strategic alliance is where two or more 
firms pool together part of their activities in 
order to strengthen their market offering 
whilst still retaining their separate corporate 
identities. In the context of the sphere of their 
activities, the firms involved will become 
relatively dependent on each other. Skill 
substitution (often in the realms of distributor 
and supplier agreements) may be one reason 
for while the move for improved organi-
zational learning may entail the formation of 
joint ventures, collaborations and consortiums 
(Segal-Horn & Faulkner, 1999). However, a 
lack of attention to issues like trust, chemistry 
and culture is likely to lead to the disbanding 
of most alliances. According to Faulkner 
(1995), trust means having sufficient 
confidence in a partner to commit valuable 
know-how and other resources to the venture 
despite the risk of the partner taking advantage 
of such a commitment. Since such trust is 
extremely difficult to create and preserve, it is 
unlikely that the partners would be 
comfortable sharing information and making 
the investments and commitments that the 
alliance need. An atmosphere of suspicion is 
likely to prevail especially in alliances in 
which the partners are competitors or potential 
competitors (Kelly et al., 2002).         
In such a context, the very existence of 
alliances between rival firms is paradoxical: 
competitors are expected to compete with one 
another rather than to join forces. In fact, 
according to Morris & Hergert (1987), 
alliances between rivals account for appro-
ximately 70 percent of all cooperative 
agreements. In alliances between competitors, 
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each partner must be open enough to 
collaborate efficiently with its rival allies, 
while still concealing critical knowledge in 
order to protect its vital interest. In this 
situation, some scholars (e.g. Hamel et al., 
1989; Hamel, 1991; Lorange & Roos, 1992; 
Nooteboom, 1999) have proposed the 
importance of core competence protection 
measures. A partner must remember that a 
strategic alliance can break up for a variety of 
unforeseen reasons. In any event, the set-up 
itself combines rivalry and cooperation 
simultaneously in an ambiguous fashion and it 
is this ambiguity which is likely to raise 
specific management problems, especially in 
the issue of the firms’ openness in the 
collaboration. In any case, in the short-run 
term, both parties are likely to gain although 
the question of how asymmetric those gains 
would be may be of a less conclusive nature.  
Ultimately, it is the long term which 
appears to be more critical and subjected to 
potential pitfalls hence reinforcing the need 
for some sort of protection. In this sense, 
managers should be aware of the fact that their 
alliance partners are basically their compe-
titors (or potential competitors). There are two 
paradoxical situations here; alliances may help 
a firm absorb or learn some critical infor-
mation or capability from its partner but at the 
same time they can also increase the 
possibility of losing one’s own core capability 
or skill to the partner. Thus, a firm faces the 
challenging task of managing the balance 
between “trying to learn and trying to protect”. 
This dilemma arises because conditions that 
might facilitate the learning process are likely 
to expose firms to the danger of losing some 
of their own crown jewels to the partner. The 
threat of technological leakage and skill 
appropriation are likely to be amplified in 
alliance cases involving global competitors. 
This is when the need for protection is critical. 
A good illustration of such a dilemma can be 
seen in the case of most alliances set up by US 
and Japanese auto manufacturers. Through the 
alliances the Japanese partners were not only 
able to sell more cars but also acquired 
precious knowledge about the North American 
market which incidentally, made it easier for 
them to eventually set up wholly-owned 
operations in the US. 
Based on the possible implications 
pertaining to losing one’s core competence to 
its partners in alliances, this paper aims to 
answer the questions of when and under what 
circumstances are the issues of protecting 
(and/or sharing of) core competences in a 
strategic alliance crucial? In addition, it also 
seeks to find and understand the many factors 
which are crucial for managers in companies 
that are engaged in strategic alliances espe-
cially when the allies are competitors (direct 
and indirect).  
INSIGHT ON THE CORE COMPETEN-
CE PROTECTION 
Essentially, a firm in an alliance faces the 
challenging task of managing the balance 
between “trying to learn and trying to protect”. 
Such a dilemma arises because the conditions 
which may stimulate the learning process are 
also likely to expose the firm to the possibility 
of losing some of their core competences to its 
partner. According to Dussauge & Garette 
(1999), the condition is akin to a “Trojan 
Horse” metaphor, in which one of the allies 
takes advantage of the alliance to capture its 
partner’s most valuable skills and thus 
strengthens its own position at the other’s 
expense. This is especially critical when the 
partner firms are also competitors as they both 
possess a strong incentive to reduce their 
mutual dependence by appropriating the 
capabilities they lack. In contrast, partners in a 
strategic alliance may also sometimes be 
tempted to increase the dependence of the 
other firm. The rationale for this is that the 
more dependent one partner is on the other, 
the more a firm (the controlling one) can 
influence the management of the alliance in 
order to serve its own interests.  
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It is reasonable, therefore, that a partner 
maintains some unique proprietary skills and 
know-how to be used as latent protection 
against the other partner in potentially adverse 
circumstances. Some researchers call this 
action as the creation of a “black box”
1
 (see: 
Lorange, 1997; Hamel et al., 1989) with the 
unique knowhow being kept away from the 
partner. Where inter-organizational theory is 
concerned, such a scenario is a particularly 
critical issue when alliances involve 
competing firms. However, in many situations 
strategic alliances are only temporary 
arrangements in which one of the partners is 
vying to strengthen its own position at the 
expense of the other. Essentially, one way to 
creating a “black box” would be to integrate 
the many knowhow aspects (eg. product, 
manufacturing, various types of software, 
management processes and financial know-
how crucial to the operations of the strategic 
alliance) into a systemic totality and it is this 
single, co-ordinated concept which is likely to 
become a formidable source of protection for 
a partner (Lorange & Roos, 1991a).     
The danger that is directly or indirectly 
causing one’s core competence to be leaked to 
its competitors is referred to as the risk of 
spillover (see Nooteboom, 1999). According 
to Nooteboom, there are three factors that 
determine the risk of spillover of control: type 
of knowledge, linkage of competitor and speed 
of change. When knowledge is more tacit, the 
risk is lower than when it is codified, and the 
risk is lower to the extent that knowledge is 
embodied in teams, procedures, organizational 
structure or culture. In this situation, one may 
be able to observe what a firm is doing, but 
                                                          
1  In aeronautics, the flame black box is installed in the 
tail of passenger aircraft and constructed in such a way 
that it remains intact in case of crash, preserving vital 
flight data. The analogous black box of an alliance 
management is not physical, of course; it is rather a set 
of particular procedures by which strategic alliances are 
conducted that allows the alliances to succeed even as 
the firm’s core knowledge is protected and preserved 
(Lorange, 1997: 60) 
fail to grasp the underlying logic and 
causality.  
Risk of spillover also depends on the 
presence of a direct or indirect linkage of 
competitors. The risk is higher, ceteris pari-
bus, in horizontal rather than vertical relations. 
It depends on the number of partners, because 
then the chance is higher that there will be 
competitors among those partners. Spillover 
can be limited by “technologies of moni-
toring”. If one can trace what happens to the 
competence supplied to a partner, in any 
subsequent diffusion in the partner’s network, 
one can demand control of diffusion by the 
partner and monitor its compliance. Hence, 
having a technology of monitoring with a 
sharp focus that sorts out what really belongs 
to the core of one’s distinctive competence 
would be crucial in this context.  
Spillover further depends on the speed of 
change. If the technological make-up of 
products changes more rapidly than it would 
take for the relevant information to spillover 
to competitors and be used for imitation, then 
the problem disappears. However, the fact that 
spillover can be accidental or otherwise raises 
the problem of identifying the source of it 
(Nooteboom, 1998).  
Lorange & Roos (1992) suggest that the 
easiest way to prevent the risk of spillover is 
simply not to give away too much of the 
firm’s unique competence at the outset. A 
black box protection must, of course, be 
maintained and upgraded over time in order to 
remain unique. It may, for instance, be 
necessary to provide additional research on an 
ongoing basis to continue, to improve one’s 
technological lead and unique know-how 
regarding the marketplace. Moreover, having 
a strong black box position gives a partner a 
sense of strategic control over the direction of 
the strategic alliance. However, the black box 
position must be maintained over time to 
ensure its uniqueness even though the process 
of continually improving the technology 
(black box) is likely to a be a delicate and 
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stressful affair since co-operation is para-
mount for the success of any alliances. 
However, it is still necessary to maintain some 
discretionary strength so that we are not taken 
“hostage” by our partner (Lorange & Roos, 
1991a).  
In addition, Das & Teng (1998) propose 
the use of a patent system as a strong 
safeguard, since informal transfers of patents 
is not possible. More specifically, firms should 
allow their partner access only to those 
patented technologies, which the partner 
cannot freely copy or apply on its own. As 
long as the technology shared in the alliance is 
patented and owned by the firm, their key 
resources are not lost. Bleeke & Ernst (1995) 
describe an alliance between two pharma-
ceutical companies that lasted for ten years. 
During the alliance period, since one firm kept 
the patent, it retained its power over the other 
partner. For unpatented knowhow, a firm 
could attempt to reduce the transparency of 
technology, and to limit the scope of the 
agreement even where technology transfers 
are unavoidable.  
In any event, the threat of spill-over is 
apparent in alliances, especially in those 
involving allies which hail from the same 
industries. Nooteboom’s (1999) assessment of 
the three factors which determine the risk of 
spillover is used to support the proposed 
model in this paper. The type of knowledge 
(e.g. how easy is the knowledge transferable), 
the linkage of competitor (e.g. the presence of 
direct competitors) and the speed of change 
(e.g. rapid changes in the technological make-
up of the product) are the crucial factors in 
learning and understanding when and under 
what circumstances protection should be 
enforced in alliances. Such a move is a crucial 
for managers as the implications could be 
devastating for firms which failed to recognize 
the warning.          
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study is based on a qualitative study 
between Dutch-American companies. There 
are three horizontal alliances as samples of the 
study: Akzo Nobel (Dutch) and Huntsman 
(U.S.A), Avebe (Dutch) and Noveon (U.S.A), 
and KLM (Dutch) and Northwest (U.S.A). 
While all three alliances in the sample were 
chosen from different industries, the allies that 
make up each of the respective alliances were, 
however from the same industries. We 
interviewed both delegations of the companies 
and the management team of the alliances. In 
total, we carried out 24 interviews. All 
interviews are tape recorded. Most of the 
interviews took more than one hour and many 
of them lasted more than two hours. A short 
description of these alliances is provided in 
Table 1. 
RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDIES 
The results of the case studies indicated 
that the most dominant factor in horizontal 
alliances is the presence of direct or indirect 
linkages with competitors. It is apparent that 
alliances between indirect competitors do not 
seriously encounter a problem of competition 
because both parties do not compete directly 
in the market. As demonstrated in our case 
studies, the three horizontal alliances in this 
study operated in different markets that 
eventually decreased the degree of 
competition among the alliance members. All 
partners in this study had relatively different 
core competences, which allowed them to 
retain their unique position in their alliance. 
However, it does not mean that they were free 
from competition. Evidence from the KLM-
Northwest and Avebe-Noveon cases clearly 
illustrated the existence of competition. In the 
beginning of the KLM-Northwest partnership, 
intensive competition occurred between the 
sales people of both companies. As they still 
kept their sales representatives in North 
America and Europe until 1997, both carriers 
faced difficulties in managing competition at 
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the sales level because Northwest’s sales 
people prefer to advise customers to travel 
with Northwest and the same attitude also 
prevails with the KLM staff. Finally, both 
airlines resolved this problem by integrating 
their sales force. Northwest closed their sales 
representative in Europe and was then totally 
responsible for the sales in North America 
while the KLM sales office in America was 
also closed and they in turn, committed further 
to the European market. This new settlement 
had not only resolved the competition problem 
but also proved to be a brilliant strategy to 
minimize the operation costs and optimize the 
alliance’s profitability.  
In the Avebe-Noveon case, we saw a very 
interesting change in competition. At the 
beginning of their partnership, both partners 
enjoyed a mutual cooperation without any 
sense of competition. The tension of competi-
tion started to shake the alliance after Noveon 
purchased Diamalt, a direct competitor of 
Avebe in Europe. Soon after that, both 
partners found their salesmen competing with 
each other in the same market (Europe and 
Asia). This competitive situation threatened 
the alliance’s continuation. Their joint product 
had poor commercial success and they started 
to compete with each other in the same 
market. The alliance collapsed shortly after 
the Diamalt acquisition. It is clear that the 
shift in position from indirect competitor to 
direct competitor changed the Avebe-Noveon 
relationship. This is congruent with the results 
of a quantitative study conducted by Mowery 
et al. (1996) which stated that firms are less 
likely to share their capabilities with partners 
when they are direct competitors in product 
markets but in the case of partners who do not 
compete in the same market, they are likely to 
have a low degree of competition. Thus, the 
risk of spillover of control seems to be higher 
between direct competitors than indirect ones.  
It is also important to take into account 
that the risk of spillover is highly related to 
what partners share in the alliance. In this 
respect, we see that the main subject of the 
Akzo Nobel-Huntsman alliance is purely 
about the supply of raw materials. Both 
partners do not significantly share their core 
competence in know-how so in this case, the 
risk of spillover is relatively low in this 
partnership. However, the situation was 
completely different in the case of the Avebe-
Table 1. Characteristics of the alliances studied 
 Akzo Nobel –Huntsman Avebe - Noveon KLM - Northwest 
Industry Chemical Chemical Airline 
Formation 1972 1995 1991 
Nature of 
cooperation 
Supply of raw material  Joint know-how to produce a 
chemical product (for textile) 
that would be marketed 
separately 
Joint strategy and service in  
trans-Atlantic market 
Core compe-
tence shared 
in the alliance 
Akzo: Chlorine 
Huntsman: HCl 
Avebe: starch technology 
Noveon: synthetics technology 
KLM & Northwest: All 
airline activates in trans-
Atlantic market 
Nature of 
horizontal 
relations 
Indirect because they are 
part of supply chain 
production 
Indirect because of different 
type of technology 
Direct in South East Asia 
market BUT indirect in other 
markets 
Alliance 
development 
Continued after having 
severe dispute 
Collapsed after four years of its 
cooperation 
Continued after facing 
difficult time 
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Noveon alliance, which had shared knowledge 
as a core component within their alliance. 
Although both companies had dissimilar types 
of technology and different business interest, 
they were fully aware of the fact that their 
partner could also become a competitor in the 
near future. Therefore, they prevented a strong 
spillover of control by keeping their core 
product’s specific ingredient away from their 
partner. It meant that both partners could not 
simply break the alliance and ask other 
companies to make starch/acrylate (the 
product involved in the alliance) for them. In 
order to prevent competition in the same 
market, Avebe and Noveon also signed a 
marketing agreement to divide the world 
market into two, with both parties agreeing not 
to enter into the markets that were under the 
responsibility of their other. In addition, in a 
move to keep their competitive advantages 
intact in the eyes of their competitors, Avebe 
and Noveon did not officially announce that 
they were working together to create their 
premium product.  
Strong protection of core competencies 
was not significant in the case of the KLM-
Northwest partnership. Their scope of 
cooperation was so extensive and closely 
linked to each other that both partners thought 
it was not useful to conceal anything from 
their partner. In addition, they also believed 
that the high speed of change in the 
environment and technology will diminish the 
value of their competence anyway. Whatever 
they keep secret today will not be a secret 
anymore in a year’s time. The high speed of 
change in technology required the alliance 
partner to open up their key contributions. 
This evidence supports Nooteboom’s (1999: 
50) analysis that spillover also depends on the 
speed of technological change. If the techno-
logical make-up of products changes more 
rapidly than it would take for the relevant 
information to spill over to competitors and be 
used for imitation, then the fear of spillover 
disappears. 
Based on the above analysis, we may 
draw a conclusion that the risk of spillover is 
strongly dependent on three variables: 
1. the presence of direct or indirect linkages 
of competitors: Partners who do not 
compete in the same market face a lower 
degree of competition than partners who 
directly compete with each other  
2. the type of knowledge: In order to remain 
unique, important know-how that belongs 
to the company’s core competencies 
should be protected  
3. the speed of change: Technology or know-
how that changes rapidly should be shared 
with the partner and not be kept to oneself  
PROPOSED MODEL FOR CORE COM-
PETENCE PROTECTION 
Alliance managers should carefully 
consider the positive and negative impacts of 
keeping or sharing their company’s core 
competence with their partner. However, from 
the perspective of the success of the alliance 
as a whole, it is often the “lack of trust” and 
the feeling of “uncertain and discomfort” 
which hinders the success of alliances. In this 
respect, we suggest firms to openly discuss 
how they are going to manage the spill-over of 
control with their partner(s). Each partner 
should recognize and acknowledge that a 
move to protect one’s core competence should 
be a reasonable move and perhaps even quite 
legitimate and certainly not be deemed as a 
provocative or offensive move. Such acknow-
ledgement is paramount especially in the 
context of today’s decision maker which 
unfortunately, not only has to function in a 
competitive and hostile environment but also 
knows that it may be imperative to cooperate 
with others which is likely to be a competitor 
in many instances. Thus, the need to 
understand more about managing and sharing 
information in alliances is more apparent and 
crucial than ever before. 
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Based on the literature review and the 
case studies, we may draw a conclusion that 
the tension of competition is highly influenced 
by the condition whether they are direct or 
indirect competitors. Partners who do not 
compete in the same market apparently have a 
lower degree of competition than partners who 
directly compete with each other. To protect 
or develop their core competence, managers 
should realize that the risk of spillover of 
control is determined by the type of 
knowledge and the speed of technological 
change. This is explained in the proposed 
model presented in Figure 1.  
The required level of protection is 
determined by how critical the capability is to 
the firm and the speed of change of the related 
technology. If the capability is a part of the 
firm’s core competence and the speed of 
technological change is low, the capability 
should be protected. However, if the capability 
is critical but the technological change is 
rapid, it is better to share it with partners to 
maximize value. On the other hand, if the 
capability is not the core competence of the 
company but the speed of technological 
change is relatively low, perhaps it is better to 
share conditionally. Finally, if the capability is 
not critical and technological changes take 
place rapidly, it can easily be shared.  
 The protection of a capability can be 
ensured either by legal means, e.g. licensing or 
restricted contracts, or by physical protection 
to prevent the partner’s employees from 
coming into contact with and learning about 
the technology. This spillover effect has been 
described in many management literatures 
(see: Khanna et al., 1998; King et al., 2001). 
One outcome is that a partner can be ‘dumped’ 
and the partner company may proceed further 
on its own while another scenario could be the 
partner is forced to give up more (access to) 
knowledge or be satisfied with a less lucrative 
remuneration in order to continue benefiting 
from the alliance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The “Trojan Horse” metaphor, in which 
one of the allies takes advantage of the 
alliance to capture its partner’s most valuable 
skills and thus strengthens its own position (at 
the other partner’s expense) clearly highlights 
a dilemma in which firms may be forced to 
rethink their strategies. In this context, 
protecting its own core competencies at the 
outset of the alliance may prove to be most 
significant. From the discussion above, it is 
obvious that there is a case for firms to be 
 
Figure 1. The model of spill-over of control 
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cautious and to undertake measures like the 
formation of a black box in order to protect 
itself from losing its crown jewels to its 
alliance partner(s). Such a situation, known as 
the risk of spillover of control, may be 
mitigated by having a technology of moni-
toring with a sharp focus that sorts out what 
really belongs to the core of one’s distinctive 
competence. From the literature and the case 
studies, we conclude that the importance of 
spillover of control is determined by the type 
of knowledge (the uniqueness of technology 
involved) and the speed of technological 
change. Nevertheless, managers should also 
take into consideration the presence of direct 
or indirect linkages with competitors. It is 
apparent that alliances between indirect 
competitors do not seriously encounter a 
problem of competition because both parties 
do not compete directly in the market but the 
situation could be a lot more delicate in the 
case of direct ones.  
Below are our recommendations on how spill 
over of control should be managed: 
 It is important for company to assess the 
position of your partner(s) and the likely 
competition you may face from them. If 
your partner is a direct competitor, 
sincerely discuss with them what kind of 
strategy/action should be addressed to 
eliminate the degree of competition and 
increase the likelihood of a joint 
cooperation in the partnership. 
 Evaluate how critical the capability is to 
your company and the speed of change in 
that capability in the future. Consider the 
following action (s): 
- If the capability is a part of your firm’s 
core competence and its speed of 
exchange is low, then the capability 
should be protected.  
- If the capability is critical but the 
changes are rapid, it is better to share it 
with partners to maximize its value.  
- If the capability is not the core 
competency of the company but the 
speed of change is relatively low, per-
haps it is better to share conditionally. 
- Finally, if the capability is not critical 
and changes take place rapidly, it can 
easily be shared. 
To sum up, in a situation of co-operation 
and competition, each partner should recog-
nize that a reasonable black box protection is 
quite legitimate, and that such a decision 
should not be interpreted as a provocative 
move. Managers representing these firms must 
fully understand the critical technologies to be 
developed and shared, and the core techno-
logies of their own firm that will nonetheless, 
remain separate. It is essential that internal 
proprietary technologies be protected in order 
to preserve a firm’s competitive edge.  
Since this qualitative study only based on 
three alliances, it will be very much interesting 
to test the above framework in a much boarder 
population and off course in a different metho-
dology research. The next agenda for future 
research is also seeing whether there is also a 
different urgency of black box protection 
across industry, e.g.: service and manufac-
turing industry.  
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